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Abstract
Suppose customers need to choose when to arrive to a congested
queue with some desired service at the end, provided by a single server
that operates only during a certain time interval. We study a model
where the customers incur not only congestion (waiting) costs but also
penalties for their index of arrival. Arriving before other customers
is desirable when the value of service decreases with every admitted
customer. This may be the case for example when arriving at a concert
or a bus with unmarked seats or going to lunch in a busy cafeteria. We
provide game theoretic analysis of such queueing systems with a given
number of customers, specifically we characterize the arrival process
which constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
When customers are faced with the decision of when to arrive to a queueing
system with some desired service at the end, the first issue to consider is
avoiding congestion. This disutility is typically modelled as a waiting time
cost. Such a model was first considered by Glazer and Hassin [3]. They
assumed that the number of customers arriving to the queue is a Poisson
random variable, which as it turns out makes the analysis easier than the
∗Department of Statistics and the Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, 91905 Jerusalem, Israel. liron.ravner@mail.huji.ac.il
1
ar
X
iv
:1
30
8.
61
00
v3
  [
ma
th.
PR
]  
10
 A
pr
 20
14
deterministic case, or any other distribution. However, in many queueing
scenarios customers may also be interested in being served at an early time.
Such an example is driving home from work, where commuters wish to avoid
traffic but are not willing to stay at work until midnight in order to achieve
this. This type of disutility has been modelled as a tardiness cost that in-
creases the later one is admitted into service. Some recent research has been
carried out on this model by Haviv in [9] and by Juneja and Shimkin in
[17]. The first considered a Poisson number of customers and studied the
equilibrium properties when limiting the allowed arrival period. The latter
considered a general number of customers and focused on a rigorous charac-
terization of the Nash equilibrium, and the proof of convergence to the fluid
limit. Both also presented fluid approximation models which are technically
less cumbersome, and often provide insight on the discrete stochastic case.
In many queueing scenarios customers are not actually worried about
tardiness, but rather about the number of customers who arrived ahead of
them. This is the case in a concert or flight with unmarked seats, when
there is no actual penalty for tardiness unless other customers have arrived
and taken hold of the better seats. This brings us to the focus of this work,
which is to present a model where one’s cost is not necessarily time based,
but rather dependent on the number of prior arrivals. If this is the only
disutility assumed in the model, then obviously all customers arrive as early
as possible. However, if there are also waiting costs, customers may improve
their utility by not arriving in close proximity to others, which leads to a
more interesting analysis of their strategic behaviour. In the rest of this
section we introduce the model and review some related literature.
Our analysis commences in section 2 by illustrating an example of a two
customer game, and comparing it to the known results for the tardiness
model. We show that the support of the symmetric equilibrium arrival dis-
tribution is infinite if there is no closing time for the server, as opposed to
the finite support obtained in the tardiness model. In particular, the equilib-
rium distribution is uniform prior to the opening time, and exponential after
it. We further show how the equilibrium is adjusted if early birds are not
allowed, and when the server has a closing time. All solutions for the two cus-
tomer game are explicitly derived. In section 3 we consider a general model
with any number of customers. The explicit solution is not tractable for the
general model, but we characterize the equilibrium properties and dynamics,
accompanied by a numerical technique to compute it. We also provide an
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analysis of the tail behaviour of the arrival distribution, and prove that the
tail behaviour is exponential. Numerical analysis also suggests that the tail
of the arrival hazard rate equals exactly to the exponential rate found in the
two customer case (regardless of the population size). We also examine how
an immediate generalization can be made to a model with both order and
tardiness costs. We further provide bounds on the cost incurred by any single
customer in equilibrium, in this general setting. In section 4 we present the
symmetric equilibrium for an a random number of customers, which follows
a Poisson distribution. In section 5 we briefly discuss the social optimization
problem and explain how the existing literature relates to the model we have
presented. Finally, in section 6 we summarize the results and discuss possible
extensions and future work.
Remark Much of the ”essence” of the model is captured in the two-customer
analysis of section 2. Section 3 is a more technical generalization. The main
results are stated in Theorems 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, and numerical examples for
the general model are presented in subsection 3.4.
1.1 Model
Suppose that N+1 customers wish to obtain service. We assume that a single
server provides the service according to a First Come First Served regime,
and that service times are independent and exponentially distributed with
rate µ. If multiple customers arrive at exactly the same time, then they are
admitted in uniformly random order. The customers incur a delay cost of α
per unit of time, a tardiness cost of β per unit of time until their admittance
into service and an index of arrival cost γ for every customer that has arrived
before them. We denote the closing time by T > 0, where T = ∞ means
there is no closing time. For most of this work we assume that β = 0, and
analyse the model with only waiting and order costs. Where possible, we
also consider β > 0 for the sake of comparison and generalization.
In [17], the equilibrium for a general N customer was characterized under
the assumption that customers are limited to arrival distributions F such
that: ”For each F , the corresponding support can locally (i.e., on any fi-
nite interval) be represented as a finite union of closed intervals and points”.
They proved that under this assumption, the equilibrium arrival profile is
unique and symmetric. We focus here only on distributions that satisfy this
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assumption.
The symmetric equilibrium mixed strategy is defined by a cdf denoted
by F (t) for all t ∈ R. We also denote the density function f(t) = F ′(t) for
all t such that F (t) is continuous and differentiable. We seek a cdf F such
that if the other N customers arrive according to F , then the last customer
is indifferent between arriving at all points of the support of F , and does
not prefer any point outside of the support. The expected cost of arriving at
time t ∈ R is:
cF (t) = −αt1{t<0} + α + β
µ
EQF (t) + βt1{t≥0} + γEAF (t), (1.1)
where QF (t) and AF (t) are the queue size and the arrival process at time t,
respectively, when N customers are arriving independently according to F .
The value of the arrival process at time t, AF (t), is in fact the index of arrival
of the last customer to arrive up until time t. In the following sections we will
simply denote these processes by Q(t) and A(t), although their distribution
is always determined by F . Note that EAF (t) = NF (t), but the expected
queue size depends on both arrivals and departures, and typically does not
have an explicit form as a function of F .
Remark The majority of our analysis assumes that the size of N is common
knowledge. It is important to note however, that all results may be general-
ized to any prior distribution on N in a fairly straightforward manner. The
special case of the Poisson distribution has simplifying properties which we
shall elaborate on in section 4.
1.2 Preliminary analysis of the index cost model
Suppose β = 0 and α, γ > 0, i.e. customers only incur waiting and index
costs. This special case of the model has several unique equilibrium properties
which will be used throughout our analysis. We state these properties in the
following two lemmata and their subsequent corollary.
The cost function (1.1) can now be rewritten:
c(t) = −αt1{t<0} + α
µ
EQ(t) + γEA(t). (1.2)
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Lemma 1.1 There exists no symmetric equilibrium arrival profile such that
for some finite time tb, all customers have arrived with probability one;
F (tb) = 1. Furthermore, the expected cost in equilibrium is at most γ.
Proof We assume that there exists such an equilibrium arrival profile, and
show that this leads to a contradiction. Any customer can achieve the cost
γ +  for any  > 0 by arriving at a very large t > tb. This is because
the probability that the server is still busy approaches zero when t → ∞.
Therefore, the expected cost, denoted by ce, in this equilibrium is at most γ.
This cost is constant on all of the support, specifically at time tb:
ce = c(tb) =
α
µ
EQ(t) + γ > γ (1.3)
Contradicting the previous argument, that ce ≤ γ.
Lemma 1.2 There can be no holes in a symmetric equilibrium arrival pro-
file. In other words, there exists no time t such that F (t) > F (t−), where
F (t−) = lims↑t F (s) is the limit from the left of the cdf at point t (the point
of upward discontinuity).
Proof Assume there exists a time t such that F (t) > F (t−). The left limit
from the left of the cost function (1.2) at t is:
c(t−) = −αt1{t<0} + α
µ
EQ(t−) + γF (t−).
The expected queue size can only have upward jumps, i.e. EQ(s−) ≤ EQ(s)
for any time s (see for example Lemma 2 in [17]). Therefore, we can conclude
that c(t−) < c(t), which contradicts the equilibrium assumption.
Corollary 1.3 The support of the equilibrium distribution F can be repre-
sented as an interval [ta,∞), for some finite and negative ta.
Note that ta > −∞ because limt→−∞ c(t) =∞ for any F , and in Lemma
1.1 we established that the equilibrium cost is at most γ.
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1.3 Related literature
In 1969 Vickrey published his seminal paper ”Congestion Theory and Trans-
port Investment” [24], which presented a fluid model for congestion dynamics.
In particular, Nash equilibrium arrival dynamics where characterized for a
bottleneck model. This model was studied and developed in various direc-
tions in the following decades, among many others by Arnott, de Palma and
Lindsey [2], Verhoef [23] and Otsubo and Rapoport [19]. The latter is the
most closely related to this work because they assume a discrete (non-fluid)
number of customers. However, they consider a discrete action space, i.e.
the arrivals take place at predefined unit intervals.
Most of the research on the strategic behaviour in queues, deals primarily
with models with a discrete action space, such as whether to join a queue or
not or choosing between several queues. Furthermore, the analysis is often
focused on the steady state equilibrium properties. The book by Hassin
and Haviv [6] presents many results in this field and surveys the existing
literature. As mentioned above, the first to examine a model where customers
choose their arrival time to a queue were Glazer and Hassin in [3]. In [4]
they extended this analysis to a server with bulk service, for example a bus
that can carry many customers at once. The main technical differences in
this kind of analysis are the continuous action space, and the fact that the
analysis requires transient analysis, rather than stationary. In recent years
there have been several developments in the research of these models. Among
them are the above mentioned works by Haviv [9] and Juneja and Shinkin
[17]. In the fluid setting, models with non-homogeneous customer types were
studied by Jain, Juneja and Shimkin in [15] and Honnappa and Jain in [13]
for a queueing network. An additional fluid model with a random volume
of arrivals was analysed in [16] by Juneja, Raheja and Shimkin. Hassin and
Kleiner [7] studied a model with opening and closing times, and no tardiness
cost. In [12], Haviv and Ravner examine a multi-server system with no
queue buffer, where customers are interested in maximizing the probability
of obtaining service. Honnappa, Jain and Ward characterize the general
properties of a single server queue with individual customer arrivals in [14],
along with finding the transient fluid and diffusion limits of the process. In
[10], Haviv, Kella and Kerner analyse a model where customers observe their
order of arrival, but the decision variable is still binary: join or balk. Our
aim is to add to this body of work by introducing a new cost structure which
takes into account the order of the arrivals.
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2 Two customer arrival game
Let N = 1, which means each customer knows there is only one other cus-
tomer. We will present explicit equilibrium solutions for several scenarios
and compare them to the known result of the tardiness cost model.
2.1 Tardiness cost
Suppose that γ = 0 and β > 0. In [17] the two customer case was explicitly
solved. They showed that the symmetric equilibrium arrival distribution F
with density f which is uniform before time zero linearly decreasing after:
f(t) =

µ α
α+β
, t ∈ [ta, 0)
−µ β
α+β
− µ2
α+β
(βt+ αta), t ∈ [0, tb]
0, o.w.
, (2.1)
where
− ta = 1
µ
√
β
α
(
2 +
β
α
)
(2.2)
and
tb =
1
µ
(√
1 +
2α
β
− 1
)
(2.3)
define the support of F . Note that the density f has a a downwards dis-
continuity at time zero. Finally, the expected cost for each customer in
equilibrium equals −αta.
t
f(t)
-0.5 -0.29 0 0.55 1
1
2
Figure 1: Equilibrium arrival density - tardiness cost (µ = 3, α = 6, β = 2)
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2.2 Index cost
Now we consider the case where the waiting cost is the same as above, but
instead of the tardiness cost a customer incurs a cost of γ if the other customer
has arrived before him. From Corollary 1.3 we know that any equilibrium
arrival distribution in this case is given by a continuous cdf F defined on
a support interval [ta,∞), where −∞ < ta < 0. We next show that the
equilibrium arrival density is again uniform before time zero, but after time
zero it is exponential.
Theorem 2.1 The following density defines a unique symmetric equilibrium
arrival distribution:
f(t) =

α
γ+α
µ
, t ∈ [− γ
α
, 0
]
µ
(1+ αγµ)(1+
γµ
α )
e
− µ
1+ αγµ
t
, t ∈ (0,∞)
0 , o.w.
. (2.4)
The expected cost for each customer in this equilibrium is ce = γ.
Proof Suppose, without loss of generality, that the first customer arrives
according to some distribution with cdf G and density g. The following
analysis establishes conditions such that playing G is a best response for the
second customer, i.e. that there exists some constant ce such that this is her
expected cost on the support of G, and at least ce outside of the support.
We will show that the distribution defined by the density f in (2.4) is the
unique solution that satisfies these conditions.
No service is given before the opening, so all customers who have arrived
are still in the queue: EQ(t) = EA(t) = G(t), ∀t < 0. Therefore, the cost of
arriving before the opening, at some time t < 0 is:
c(t) = −αt+ α
µ
G(t) + γG(t). (2.5)
The equilibrium condition for t < 0 is now:
ce = −αt+ α
µ
G(t) + γG(t). (2.6)
By taking derivative we obtain the first part of (2.4), which means that any
equilibrium density g satisfies g(t) = f(t), ∀t < 0.
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After time zero, the server commences operation and the system can be
presented as a non-homogeneous in time Markov process with the following
three states: {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}, where (i, j) is the state that there are i
customers in the system and j have already arrived. We denote the proba-
bility of state (i, j) by pij := P(Q(t) = i, A(t) = j). The dynamics of this
process satisfy the following set of differential equations:
p
′
0,0(t) = −
g(t)
1−G(t)p0,0(t) (2.7)
p
′
0,1(t) = µp1,1(t) (2.8)
p
′
1,1(t) =
g(t)
1−G(t)p0,0(t)− µp1,1(t). (2.9)
Note that the the expected queue size is exactly p1,1(t) in this case, and so
the equilibrium condition can be written as follows:
ce =
α
µ
p1,1(t) + γG(t), (2.10)
and by taking derivatives:
p
′
1,1(t) = −
γµ
α
g(t). (2.11)
From (2.9) we also have:
p
′
1,1(t) =
g(t)
1−G(t)p0,0(t)− µp1,1(t) = g(t)− µp1,1(t). (2.12)
The second equation is due to the fact that the probability of the state
(0, 0) is the probability that the other customer has not arrived yet, namely
1−G(t). And by combining the last two equations we get:
p1,1(t) = g(t)
(
1
µ
+
γ
α
)
. (2.13)
We have thus far established thatG is the solution to the following differential
equation:
ce =
α
µ
g(t)
(
1
µ
+
γ
α
)
+ γG(t) , t ≥ 0. (2.14)
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In order to solve this equation explicitly we need to obtain ce and G(0).
We argue that if G is a solution to (2.14) on a support of [0,∞) then ce =
γ. This is because if we take a limit to infinity, then g(t) approaches zero
and G(t) approaches one, and so the cost approaches γ. But for this to be
equilibrium the cost throughout the support must equal γ. This implies that
the beginning of the negative interval is ta = − γα and that G(0) = γγ+α
µ
. We
complete the proof by stating that the density function f in the positive part
of (2.4) is the unique solution to the linear differential equation defined by
all of the above:
g(t)
(
α
γµ2
+
1
µ
)
= (1−G(t)) , G(0) = 1
1 + α
γµ
. (2.15)
Remark 1 Note that also in this case, f has a downward discontinuity at
zero. This can be argued by a few algebraic steps showing that the following
two inequalities are equivalent:
α
γ + α
µ
>
µ(
1 + α
γµ
) (
1 + γµ
α
) , (2.16)
and
α
γµ
> 0. (2.17)
Remark 2 The hazard rate of the equilibrium arrival distribution for t > 0
is h(t) = µ
1+ α
γµ
. This constant will appear again in the numerical analysis
part of section 3, where we will show that although the general equilibrium
arrival distribution for any number of customers is not exponential, the haz-
ard rate approaches this very same rate (which is independent of the number
of customers).
2.3 Index cost - no early birds
Suppose now that there is no option to queue before the server commences
operation. We assume the same index cost function as in the previous sub-
section. First we argue that in a symmetric equilibrium, customers arrive at
10
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Figure 2: Equilibrium arrival density - Index Cost (µ = 3, α = 6, γ = 1)
time zero with some positive probability, denoted by p0 > 0. For if this was
not the case, then any customer could reduce her own cost to zero by arriving
at time zero with probability 1. Recall that if both customers arrive at the
same time then they are admitted into service in a random order. Given the
equilibrium probability p0, the cost of arriving at time zero is:
c(0) =
p0
2
(
α
µ
+ γ
)
. (2.18)
As in the previous subsection, any customer can guarantee a cost as close
as she desires to γ by arriving late enough. Therefore, if p0 < 1 then we
have c(0) = γ. This is the outcome when the cost of waiting for the service
completion of the other customer is higher than the cost of arriving last:
α
µ
> γ. Otherwise, both customers can ensure a cost that is lower than
γ (but higher than γ
2
) by arriving at time zero with probability 1. The
conclusion from the above is that in equilibrium the probability to arrive at
time zero is:
p0 =
{
2γ
γ+α
µ
, α
µ
> γ
1 , α
µ
≤ γ . (2.19)
The corresponding equilibrium costs are γ and 1
2
(
α
µ
+ γ
)
, respectively.
Next we seek the arrival distribution after time zero for the case where α
µ
> γ.
If the other customer has arrived at time zero, then the probability that he
is still in service at time t is e−µt. Therefore, if the arrival probability at zero
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is p0 and 0 on the interval (0, t], then the expected cost at time t is:
c(t) =
2γ
γ + α
µ
(
γ + e−µt
α
µ
)
. (2.20)
This is a decreasing function of t that initiates at c(0) = 2γ. Therefore,
there exists some te such that arriving anywhere in (0, te) costs more than
the equilibrium cost of γ. Thus, in equilibrium f(t) = 0 for all t ∈ (0, te). By
comparing (2.20) to γ we conclude that te = − 1
µ
log
(
1
2
(
1− γµ
α
))
. Finally,
we are left with computing f(t) for all t ≥ te. The system dynamics and
the equilibrium conditions are identical to the ones presented in the early
bird case with the initial condition F (te) = p0
1. Therefore, the density for
t > te is: f(t) = (1 − p0)µ2p0e−
µ
2
p0(t−te). The following theorem summarizes
the results of this subsection.
Theorem 2.2 For the two customer game with no early birds the symmetric
equilibrium arrival distribution is given by:
1. If α
µ
≤ γ then p0 = 1, i.e. both customers arrive at time zero and
are admitted into service in random order. The expected cost for each
customer is 1
2
(
α
µ
+ γ
)
.
2. If α
µ
> γ then p0 =
2γ
γ+α
µ
and:
f(t) = (1− p0)µ
2
p0e
−µ
2
p0(t−te)1{t≥te}, (2.21)
where te = − 1
µ
log
(
1
2
(
1− γµ
α
))
. The expected cost for each customer is
γ.
Remark 1 If α
µ
< γ then 1
2
(
α
µ
+ γ
)
< γ, which means that the equilibrium
cost of both customers decreased when the opportunity to arrive early was
taken away. Overall, we have shown that not allowing early birds increases
social welfare.
1It makes no difference for the analysis if the customers have all arrived at an atom or
uniformly on an interval, as long as the initial conditions are the same.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium arrival cdf - index cost and no early birds
(µ = 2, α = 6, γ = 1)
Remark 2 We overlook the possible existence of non symmetric equilibria
of the form: customer 1 arrives at zero and customer 2 arrives at some time
T such that her cost is lower than 1
2
(
α
µ
+ γ
)
. If such an equilibrium exists,
then by swapping the customer’s roles we get an additional equilibrium, and
generally there may be multiple equilibria of this form.
2.4 Index cost - finite closing time
Suppose again that early birds are allowed, but entry to the system is only
possible up until some time T < ∞. Service is provided to all who arrived
prior to time T even if it is completed after the closing time. The arrival
density prior to time zero is as in the no closing time case: f(t) = α
γ+α
µ
.
Customers can no longer ensure a cost of no more than γ by arriving very
late. Moreover, the equilibrium cost is strictly higher than γ, because the
cost at closing time is c(T ) = γ+P(Q(t) = 1)α
µ
. Thus, we can conclude that
arrivals start at an earlier time than in the previous case: ta < − γα (as before,
the equilibrium cost is still −taα). Given ta we can compute F (0) = −taαγ+α
µ
,
and the dynamics after time zero are as before. From (2.14) we derive the
equilibrium equation:
− taα = α
µ
f(t)
(
1
µ
+
γ
α
)
+ γF (t), 0 ≤ t < T. (2.22)
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Coupled with the initial condition F (0), the solution of this equation is:
F (t) = −taα
γ
1− e− µt1+ αγµ
1 + γµ
α
 . (2.23)
By taking F (T ) = 1 we can explicitly derive: ta = − γα
(
1− e
− µT
1+ αγµ
1+ γµ
α
)−1
.
Recall that the equilibrium cost is −taα, thus the cost is a decreasing function
of T that approaches γ, i.e. the cost with no closing time. We can now plug
ta in F (0) and F (t), for 0 ≤ t ≤ T :
F (t) =
(
1− e
− µt
1+ αγµ
1+ γµ
α
)
(
1− e
− µT
1+ αγµ
1+ γµ
α
) , 0 ≤ t < T , F (0) =
(
1− e
− µT
1+ αγµ
1+ γµ
α
)
1 + α
γµ
. (2.24)
We summarize the above analysis in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.3 The equilibrium arrival distribution for the two customer game
with closing time T is defined by the following density:
f(t) =

α
γ+α
µ
, t ∈
− γ
α
(
1− e
− µT
1+ αγµ
1+ γµ
α
)−1
, 0

µ
(1+ αγµ)
1+ γµ
α
−e
− µT
1+ αγµ
e
− µt
1+ αγµ , t ∈ [0, T ]
0 , o.w.
,
(2.25)
and the equilibrium cost of every customer is γ
(
1− e
− µT
1+ αγµ
1+ γµ
α
)−1
.
2.5 Index cost - finite closing time and no early birds
We now wish to combine the two previous scenarios and consider an arrival
game where arrivals are only allowed during a finite interval [0, T ]. We first
14
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Figure 4: Equilibrium arrival density - index cost and a finite closing time
(µ = 3, α = 6, γ = 2, T = 1)
seek a condition for the strategy of arriving at time zero with probability one
to be an equilibrium. This is the case if when the other customer arrives at
time zero, the cost of arriving at zero too is lower than arriving at the closing
time:
1
2
(
α
µ
+ γ
)
≤ γ + α
µ
e−µT ⇔ α
µ
(1− 2e−µT ) ≤ γ. (2.26)
Hence, when the parameters satisfy this condition then using the notation
of the previous sections we have p0 = 1. The equilibrium cost here is the
expression on the left of (2.26). Otherwise, we have p0 < 1 and an equilibrium
cost of p0
2
(
γ + α
µ
)
. As before, there is a gap after time zero in the support
of the distribution, because for any p0 the cost of arriving at any time t in
such a gap is:
c(t) = p0
(
γ +
α
µ
e−µt
)
. (2.27)
Denote by te the first time that this cost equals the equilibrium cost, and we
can compute this value by comparing to the equilibrium cost:
p0
(
γ +
α
µ
e−µt
e
)
=
p0
2
(
γ +
α
µ
)
. (2.28)
Clearly, the solution is the same as in the case without a closing time: te =
− 1
µ
log
(
1
2
(
1− γµ
α
))
. The dynamics after time te are as in the previous section
with F (te) = p0. Thus, we can compute F (t) by solving the equation:
p0
2
(
γ +
α
µ
)
=
α
µ
f(t)
(
1
µ
+
γ
α
)
+ γF (t) , t ∈ [te, T ]. (2.29)
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Finally, together with the equation F (T ) = 1 we obtain:
p0 =
2
1 + α
γµ
−
(
α
γµ
− 1
)
e
− µ
1+ αγµ
(T−te) (2.30)
and
F (t) =
1 + α
γµ
−
(
α
γµ
− 1
)
e
− µ
1+ αγµ
(t−te)
1 + α
γµ
−
(
α
γµ
− 1
)
e
− µ
1+ αγµ
(T−te) , t ∈ [te, T ]. (2.31)
We conclude this section by stating the resulting theorem:
Theorem 2.4 The equilibrium arrival distribution for the two customer game
with arrivals allowed only in the interval [0, T ], is given by:
(1) If α
µ
(1 − 2e−µT ) ≤ γ then p0 = 1, i.e. both customers arrive at time
zero and are admitted into service in random order. The expected cost
for each customer is 1
2
(
α
µ
+ γ
)
.
(2) If α
µ
(1− 2e−µT ) > γ then p0 = 2
1+ α
γµ
−( αγµ−1)e
− µ
1+ αγµ
(T−te) and:
f(t) =
p0µ
2
α
γµ
− 1
α
γµ
+ 1
e
− µ
1+ αγµ
(t−te)
1{t∈[te,T ]}. (2.32)
The expected cost is p0
2
(
α
µ
+ γ
)
for each customer.
Corollary 2.5 If α
µ
< γ then the equilibrium cost is lower than γ. Otherwise,
the equilibrium cost is lower than γ if T ≤ log(2)−log(1−
µγ
α )
µ
, and at least γ if
T >
log(2)−log(1−µγα )
µ
.
The conclusion from the above corollary is that limiting arrivals to an in-
terval [0, T ] may increase or decrease the social welfare, dependent on the
parameters. And in case α
µ
≥ γ a lower cost can be achieved by setting
an early enough closing time. This is an interesting observation in light of
the previous case, without early birds, where enforcing a closing time always
leads to a higher cost.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium arrival cdf - index cost, finite closing time and no early
birds (µ = 2, α = 6, γ = 1, T = 1)
3 More than two customers
Suppose now that N + 1 > 2 customers require service, and that there are
no tardiness costs. In this section we characterize the symmetric equilibrium
arrival distribution and discuss its properties. As it turns out, many of the
observations made for the two customer game are true for any population
size. In particular, we remind the reader that according to Lemma 1.2 there
can be no ”holes” in the distribution, except for the case with no early birds,
where there is one such ”hole” that we have fully described. In Theorems
3.1 and 3.2 we summarize the equilibrium properties for T =∞ and T <∞,
respectively, for both the case where early birds are allowed and for the case
where they are not. In Theorem 3.3 we state the symmetric equilibrium
cdf, explicitly for t < 0 and as a functional differential equation for t ≥ 0.
This is followed by a generalization to a model with both tardiness and order
costs. We will also provide methods for the computation of the equilibria
and present some numerical examples.
Suppose the server has no closing time and customers are allowed to arrive
as late as they wish. In the following Theorem we present the properties of
the equilibrium under this assumption. Specifically, we show that the support
of the equilibrium arrival distribution is either infinite or a single atom at
time zero, which should not come as surprise in light of the two customer
game analysis. We also show that the customer’s individual equilibrium cost
is Nγ in the case where early birds are allowed, and at most Nγ if they are
17
not allowed.
Theorem 3.1 If T =∞, then a symmetric equilibrium strategy profile sat-
isfies the following properties.
If arriving before time zero is allowed, then:
(1) The support of the equilibrium arrival distribution is an infinite interval
[ta,∞), where ta < 0.
(2) The expected cost for all customers in equilibrium is Nγ.
(3) First possible arrival is at ta = −N γα .
If arriving before time zero is not allowed, then:
(4) there is a positive probability to arrive at time zero, given by:
p0 =
{
γ
γ+α
µ
, α
µ
> γ
1 , α
µ
≤ γ . (3.1)
(5) The equilibrium cost is tightly upper bounded by Nγ.
(6) If p0 < 1, the remaining support is defined on an interval [te,∞), where
te > 0.
Proof The proof of properties (1) and (2) relies on the same continuity
argument used in Lemma 1.1: any customer can ensure a cost almost as low
as Nγ by arriving late enough, and this is lower than the equilibrium cost
for any finite support. Property (3) is a direct result of property (2): at time
ta the cost is −taα, but this must also equal the equilibrium cost along the
support, hence we obtain: ta = −N γα . Property (4) is derived by considering
the cost of arriving at time zero if all other customers arrive at time zero
with probability one:
N
2
(
α
µ
+ γ
)
. (3.2)
The (N + 1)’th customer also arrives at time zero if this cost is lower than
the cost of arriving at any time t > 0, and this is indeed the case when the
above cost is at most Nγ. Therefore, we deduce that if α
µ
≤ γ then p0 = 1.
The cost in this case is exactly (3.2) which is clearly smaller than or equal
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to Nγ. If α
µ
> γ, then in equilibrium customers arrive at time zero with
probability p0 that satisfies:
Np0
2
(
γ + α
µ
)
= Nγ. This yields: p0 =
γ
γ+α
µ
. For
any t > 0 we denote by qp(t) the expected queue size at time t, if all other
customers arrive with probability p at time zero and with probability zero
along the interval (0, t]. The cost of arriving at time t > 0 is then:
Np0γ +
α
µ
qp0(t)→
t↓0
Np0
(
γ +
α
µ
)
. (3.3)
Note that this is a monotone decreasing function in t. Thus, we can conclude
that in equilibrium there is an interval (0, te) with no arrivals. The length of
this interval te, satisfies uniquely:
Np0
2
(
γ +
α
µ
)
= Np0γ +
α
µ
qp0(te). (3.4)
We point out that if p0 = 1, then the equilibrium cost is lower than Nγ and
if p0 < 1, then it is exactly Nγ.
Remark The value of qp(t) which was defined in the above proof can be
computed using the properties of the Poisson distribution:
qp(t) =
N∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
pj(1− p)N−j
j∑
i=0
(j − i)e
−µt(µt)i
i!
. (3.5)
To complete this definition we define the limit qp(∞) := limt→∞ qp(t) = 0.
We shall make use of this notation throughout the remainder of this section.
We now impose a finite closing time for the server, after which customers
can no longer arrive. Customers who have arrived before this time will be
served even if they are still in service or in the queue at closing time. The
next Theorem presents the equilibrium properties of this scenario. Clearly
the arrival distribution has a finite support in this case, and the individual
equilibrium cost is higher than Nγ.
Theorem 3.2 If T <∞, then a symmetric equilibrium strategy profile sat-
isfies the following properties.
If arriving before time zero is allowed, then:
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(1) The support of the equilibrium arrival distribution is a finite interval
[ta, T ], where ta < −N γα .
(2) The expected cost for all customers in equilibrium is larger than Nγ.
If arriving before time zero is not allowed, then:
(3) There is a positive probability to arrive at time zero. Denote this prob-
ability by p0. If the following condition is met then p0 = 1, otherwise
p0 < 1:
N
2
(
1− γµ
α
)
≤ q1(T ). (3.6)
(4) The condition α
µ
≤ γ is sufficient (but not necessary) for p0 = 1.
(5) If p0 < 1, then the remaining support is defined on an interval [te, T ],
where te ∈ (0, T ).
Proof We first consider the case where arrivals are allowed at any time
t ≤ T . Suppose the support of F is [ta, tb], such that ta ≤ 0 and tb ≤ T . The
cost of arriving at time tb is Nγ +
α
µ
EQ(tb), and this is also the equilibrium
cost. Now assume that tb < T then the cost of arriving at any time t ∈ (tb, T ]
is lower than the equilibrium cost and this is obviously a contradiction. The
above yields properties (1) and (2).
Next we consider the case where arrivals are only allowed in the interval
[0, T ]. If all arrive at time zero with probability one, then p0 = 1 is the best
response for the (N + 1)’th customer if the cost at zero is not be higher than
the cost of arriving at T :
N
2
(
α
µ
+ γ
)
≤ Nγ + α
µ
q1(t).
2 Simple algebra leads to property (3). Note that if α
µ
≤ γ, then this condition
is met trivially for any T > 0, hence properties (3) and (4) are obtained.
Property (5) here follows the same argument leading to property (6) in the
previous theorem. Note that p0 such that te = T cannot be an equilibrium
because customers would have to arrive at T with probability 1− p0, leading
to a higher cost than that incurred by arriving at time zero (a strictly positive
mass will be added to the cost). The value of te is given by equation (3.4).
2If this is an equality, then there are N + 1 pure and non-symmetric equilibriums of
the form: one customer arrives at time T and all others at time zero.
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We have thus far characterized the equilibrium arrival distribution up
until time zero. In Lemma 1.2 we showed that the distribution can have no
holes or atoms in the interior of the support. Therefore, we seek a continuous
distribution defined by a density function f(t) such that
∫ T
te
f(t)dt = 1−F (0).
The equilibrium condition is that the cost is constant for all t such that
f(t) > 0. To achieve this we now elaborate on the second relation3 between
the arrival distribution and the queueing process. The process {Q(t) : t ≥ 0}
itself is not Markovian because the number of arrivals after time t is not
independent of the number of arrival up to it. However, {(Q(t), A(t)) : t ≥ 0}
is a non-homogeneous in time, two dimensional Markov process satisfying:
p
′
0,j(t) = µp1,j(t)− (N − j)h(t)p0,j(t), 0 ≤ j ≤ N
p
′
i,j(t) = µpi+1,j(t) + (N − j + 1)h(t)pi−1,j−1(t)
− (µ+ (N − j)h(t))pi,j(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ N
, (3.7)
where pi,j(t) = P(Q(t) = i, A(t) = j) for 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ N , and pi,j(t) = 0
otherwise. We denote the hazard rate of F by: h(t) := f(t)
1−F (t) . If early birds
are allowed, then the initial conditions for these equations are given by:
pi,j(0) =
(
N
i
)
F (0)i(1− F (0))N−i1{i=j}. (3.8)
If early birds are not allowed, then these conditions can be modified to:
pi,j(te) =
(
N
j
)
pj0(1− p0)N−j
e−µte(µte)j−i
(j − i)! 1{j≥i}. (3.9)
Clearly, P(Q(t) = 0) =
∑N
j=0 p0,j(t). We have already shown that if there is
no closing time, then the support of the equilibrium distribution is infinite.
In this case, if early birds are allowed then ta = −Nγα and F (0) = −ta αµN(α+γµ) .
Otherwise, F (0) = p0 which was derived in Theorem 3.1. If there is a clos-
ing time, then ta or p0 need to be determined according to the conditions
described in Theorem 3.2.
The following Theorem presents the equilibrium arrival distribution using
the above defined process.
3The first relation is the equilibrium condition of a constant cost on all of the support.
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Theorem 3.3 If early birds are allowed, then the equilibrium arrival distri-
bution before time zero is uniform with density:
f(t) =
αµ
N(α + γµ)
, t ∈ [ta, 0]. (3.10)
In both cases, after time zero the equilibrium arrival distribution is charac-
terized by the following functional differential equation:
f(t) =
α (1−P(Q(t) = 0))
N(α
µ
+ γ)
, t ∈ [te, T ), (3.11)
where te = 0 if early birds are allowed.
Proof At any time t < 0 the number of arrivals equals the queue size.
Therefore, given that all of the other N customers arrive according to F , the
cost of arriving at t < 0 for the (N + 1)’th customer is:
c(t) = −αt+
(
α
µ
+ γ
)
NF (t). (3.12)
By taking derivative of (3.12) we immediately obtain (3.10).
Utilizing standard queueing dynamics we can state the cost function in
the following form:
c(t) =
α
µ
(
NF (t)− µt+ µ
∫ t
0
P(Q(s) = 0)ds
)
+ γNF (t), (3.13)
and by taking derivative we get (3.11).
3.1 Tail behaviour of the arrival distribution
In section 2 we showed that the equilibrium arrival distribution is exponential
in the two customer game. For a general number of customers this is not
the case, but we can show that the arrival distribution is still light tailed.
Specifically, that there exists some η > 0 such that:
lim
t→∞
eηt(1− F (t)) <∞. (3.14)
We further show that there exists some η < µ such that eηt(1 − F (t)) has
a finite and non-zero limit. Numerical analysis suggests η = F (0)µ, but we
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were unable to explicitly prove this limit. We will provide an outline of how
more accurate analysis of the tail behaviour can be conducted in the future.
We first prove a supporting lemma that states that if the tail of the hazard
rate is increasing, then the distribution is light tailed. We then proceed to
show that the equilibrium arrival distribution characterized in Theorem 3.3
satisfies this condition.
Lemma 3.4 Let X be a non-negative and continuous random variable with
cdf F and density f . If there exists a τ such that for all t > τ the hazard
rate is non-decreasing: h(t+ s)− h(t) ≥ 0, ∀s > 0, then X is light tailed in
the sense of (3.14).
Proof Denote the tail probability of X by F (t) = 1− F (t). Recall that an
equivalent definition of the hazard function for continuous random variables
is H(T ) =
∫ t
0
h(u)du = −logF (t). So the tail probability can be represented
using the hazard rate:
F (t) = e−
∫ t
0 h(u)du. (3.15)
If there exists some τ > 0 after which the hazard rate is non-decreasing, then
for any t > τ : ∫ t
0
h(u)du ≥ Kτ + (t− τ)h(τ),
where Kτ =
∫ τ
0
h(u)du. Thus, we can bound the tail probability:
F (t) ≤ e−Kτ−(t−τ)h(τ) = e−h(τ)teTh(τ)−Kτ .
Finally, if we denote η = h(τ) then we can conclude that the distribution is
indeed light tailed:
lim
t→∞
eηtF (t) ≤ eητ−Kτ <∞.
Lemma 3.5 The equilibrium arrival distribution characterized in Theorem
3.3 satisfies the condition of Lemma 3.4, and is therefore light tailed. More-
over, there exists some η < µ such that:
lim
t→∞
eηt(1− F (t)) = C, (3.16)
where 0 < C <∞.
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Proof We prove this lemma by using the properties of the equilibrium and
the underlying queueing process to show that the tail of the hazard function
is bounded and non-decreasing, and therefore both satisfies the condition of
Lemma 3.4 and has a non-zero limit.
If we denote pi(t) := P(Q(t) = i), then according to Theorem 3.3 the
density for t > 0 is f(t) = 1−p0(t)
N( 1µ+
γ
α)
, hence the hazard rate is:
h(t) =
f(t)∫∞
t
f(u)du
=
1− p0(t)∫∞
t
1− p0(u)du
. (3.17)
Consider the dynamics of the process {Q(t), A(t)} as defined in (3.7). By
taking a sum on the number of arrivals we have:
p
′
0(t) =
N∑
j=0
p0,j(t) = µ
N∑
j=0
p1,j(t)−
N∑
j=0
(N − j)h(t)p0,j(t)
= µp1(t)− h(t)
N−1∑
j=0
(N − j)p0,j(t)
. (3.18)
The state (0, N) is clearly an absorbing one, as after all customers have
arrived and have been served, there will be no more arrivals or departures.
This implies the following when t goes to infinity:
1. p0,N(t)→ 1 and pi,j(t)→ 0, ∀(i, j) 6= (0, N)
2. p0(t)→ 1 and pi(t)→ 0, ∀i ≥ 1
3. p
′
0(t)→ 0.
We characterize the tail behaviour, i.e. for large values of t, of the hazard
rate by applying L’Hopital’s Rule:
h(t) ∼ p
′
0(t)
1− p0(t) =
µp1(t)− h(t)
∑N−1
j=0 (N − j)p0,j(t)∑N
i=1 pi(t)
. (3.19)
We first note that the RHS is upper bounded by µ:
h(t) <
µp1(t)
p1(t)
= µ. (3.20)
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We further show that the tail of the hazard rate is strictly increasing. We
define the function:
gx(t) :=
F (t+ x)− F (t)
1− F (t) . (3.21)
If gx(t) is increasing in t, for any x > 0, then the hazard rate is increasing
too (this is easily verified by (3.15)). We observe the tail behaviour of gx(t):
gx(t) =
∫ t+x
t
1− p0(u)du∫∞
t
1− p0(u)du
=
∫∞
t
1− p0(u)du−
∫∞
t+x
1− p0(u)du∫∞
t
1− p0(u)du
. (3.22)
The denominator is decreasing to zero at rate 1− p0(t), while the numerator
is decreasing at a slower rate of 1 − p0(t) − (1 − p0(t + x)). Therefore the
function gx(t) is increasing w.r.t. t, and so is h(t).
More accurate analysis of the tail behaviour may perhaps be achieved by
applying the tools of Quasi-Stationary finite state Markov chains (see [22]).
Consider the approximation of the tail given in (3.19):
h(t) ∼ µ p1(t)
1− p0(t) −
h(t)
1− p0(t)
N−1∑
j=0
(N − j)p0,j(t)
∼ µ p1(t)
1− p0(t) − p
′
0(t)
N−1∑
j=0
(N − j)p0,j(t)
∼ µ p1(t)
1− p0(t)
.
The last approximation is given by the fact that both terms in the negative
product go to zero, by the properties of the process as described above. We
are left with showing that p1(t)
1−p0(t) has a non-zero limit when t goes to infinity.
This is in fact a conditional distribution of being in state {Q(t) = 1} given
that the queue is not empty. The limit of this term can then be seen, after
slight modification, as a quasi-stationary distribution [22]. In other words,
as the limit probability of being in a transient state conditioned on the fact
that the absorbing state has not been reached. Another point of interest in
this context is characterizing the time until absorption, which in our setting
is the time until all customers have arrived and have been served. The reason
that the standard results which are surveyed by van Doorn and Pollett in
[22] cannot be applied here, is that the process at hand is not homogeneous
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in time. There are methods for dealing with stationary distributions of non-
homogeneous Markov chains, such as the ones presented by Abramov and
Lipster in [1], which may yield more accurate analysis of the tail behaviour
of the process of interest in this work. We leave these avenues for future
research.
3.2 Tardiness and index costs
Suppose now that customers may incur both tardiness and index costs; β ≥ 0
and γ ≥ 0. If early birds are allowed and there is no closing time, then
analysis similar to the above yields:
Theorem 3.6 The equilibrium arrival distribution is given by:
f(t) =
αµ
N(α + β + γµ)
, t ∈ [ta, 0) (3.23)
and:
f(t) =
µ(α + β) (1−P(Q(t) = 0))− βµ
N(α + β + γµ)
, t ∈ [0, tb], (3.24)
where tb <∞ is the upper bound of the arrival support.
The positive part of the density in Theorem 3.6 is equivalent to:
f(t)
N
µ
=
α
α + β + γµ
− α + β
α + β + γµ
P(Q(t) = 0) , t ∈ [0, tb], (3.25)
and in case γ = 0 we get:
f(t)
N
µ
=
α
α + β
−P(Q(t) = 0) , t ∈ [0, tb], (3.26)
which coincides with the result obtained in [17].
In the following lemma we provide equilibrium conditions for tb and argue
that the support of the equilibrium distribution is indeed finite.
Lemma 3.7 If β > 0 then there exists some finite time tb > 0 such that
F (tb) = 1, f(tb) = 0 and F (t) < 1 , ∀t < tb.
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Proof Let us denote the equilibrium expected cost by ce. This cost is clearly
finite since p0 ≤ 1 and |ta| <∞ (the latter stems from the fact that F (0) < 1
4). If β > 0, then the cost function c(t) is clearly unbounded because the
term βt is not bounded and all the other terms are positive. Therefore, there
must exist some time tb such that F (tb) = 1 and F (t) < 1 , ∀t < tb. To
complete the proof we assume that f(tb) > 0 and verify that this leads to a
contradiction of the equilibrium assumption. Consider the cost at any time
t > tb:
c(t) = Nγ +
α + β
µ
EQ(t) + βt. (3.27)
Recall also that for any t ≤ tb:
c′(t) = f(t)
(
α + β
µ
+ γ
)
− (α + β)(1−P(Q(t) = 0)) + β, (3.28)
and by taking derivative of (3.27) for t > tb we have:
c′(t) =
α + β
µ
d
dt
EQ(t) + β = −(α + β)(1−P(Q(t) = 0)) + β. (3.29)
The last equation comes from the fact that when there are no arrivals the
expected queue size is decreasing at rate −µ for as long as the server is busy.
If f(tb) > 0, then from (3.28) coupled with the equilibrium condition c
′(t) = 0
we can obtain:
(α + β)(1−P(Q(tb) = 0)) = f(tb)
(
α + β
µ
+ γ
)
+ β > β. (3.30)
If F (t) is continuous then so is P(Q(t) = 0) (see for example [17]). So we
can conclude that
c′(tb+) = −f(tb)
(
α + β
µ
+ γ
)
< 0, (3.31)
which is a contradiction to the equilibrium assumption.
We can therefore conclude that the equilibrium solution is of the same func-
tional form for both the tardiness cost model and the tardiness and index
4If F (0) = 1 then there would be a downward discontinuity of the cost at time zero,
contradicting the equilibrium assumption.
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costs model. The key differences are that the index model has an infinite
support, and the boundary condition is known (i.e. ta = −Nγα ). The equilib-
rium cost in the general case is larger than the cost in the index only case:
Nγ, since a customer that arrives at tb is last with probability one and there
is a strictly positive probability that there are still customers in the system.
We will derive a lower bound for both the individual equilibrium cost and
for −ta, which will be useful in the numerical computation and in the social
utility analysis.
Lemma 3.8 If we denote the individual equilibrium cost by ce, then:
N
(
β
µ
+ γ
)
< ce < N
(
α + β
µ
+ γ
)
, (3.32)
and consequently:
− N(α + β + γµ)
αµ
< ta < −N (β + γµ)
αµ
. (3.33)
Proof The RHS of (3.32) (and the LHS of (3.33)) is trivially true for it is the
cost of a customer arriving last and facing a full queue. Further the inequality
is strict because assuming an equality will lead to an immediate contradiction
to the equilibrium assumption. This is clearly a coarse bound, which we only
use in order to bound the search range in the numerical procedure presented
in the next section.
The LHS of (3.32) is of more interest and requires a more technical proof,
which follows similar steps as the proof of Lemma 10 in [17], where a respec-
tive bound is established for the model with no index costs.
We will assume that ce ≤ N
(
β
µ
+ γ
)
(or ta ≥ −N(β+γµ)αµ ), and show that
this leads to a contradiction. We first show that this assumption leads to
the conclusion that tb >
N
µ
. The characterization of the equilibrium arrival
distribution in (3.23) and (3.24) yields:
F
(
N
µ
)
= F (0) +
∫ N
µ
0
f(t)dt
= −ta αµ
N(α + β + γµ)
+
∫ N
µ
0
µ(α + β) (1−P(Q(t) = 0))− βµ
N(α + β + γµ)
dt
<
β + γµ
α + β + γµ
+
∫ N
µ
0
αµ
N(α + β + γµ)
dt = 1
.
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Hence, F
(
N
µ
)
< 1 which implies that tb >
N
µ
. Recall that the equilibrium
cost needs to be constant on all of the support, and in particular c(tb) = ce ≤
N
(
β
µ
+ γ
)
. But if tb >
N
µ
, then according to (1.1) this is not satisfied:
c(tb) =
α + β
µ
EQ(tb) + βtb + γN > β
N
µ
+ γN ≥ ce,
and thus we have reached a contradiction.
3.3 Numerical procedure
We can now present a numerical method to compute the equilibrium distri-
bution in the general setting, with no closing time or early birds (both will
be addressed later):
(1) Choose an arbitrary ta ∈ [−N(α+β+γµ)αµ ,−N(β+γµ)αµ ] (Lemma 3.8)
(2) Sequentially compute F (t) for t ≥ ta discretely according to the dy-
namics given by (3.23), (3.24):
f(t) =
{
αµ
N(α+β+γµ)
, t ∈ [ta, 0)
µ(α+β)(1−P(Q(t)=0))−βµ
N(α+β+γµ)
, t ∈ [0, tb] .
The approximation step of P(Q(t) = 0) from t to t+ ∆ is given by the
Kolmogorov equations in (3.7):
p0,j(t+ ∆) = p0,j(t) + ∆µp1,j(t)−∆(N − j)h(t)p0,j(t), 1 ≤ j ≤ N
pi,j(t+ ∆) = pi,j(t) + ∆µpi+1,j(t) + ∆(N − j + 1)h(t)pi−1,j−1(t)
= −∆(µ+ (N − j)h(t))pi,j(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ N
,
where ∆ > 0 is the discretization parameter. The initial conditions are
given by (3.8):
pi,j(0) =
(
N
i
)
F (0)i(1− F (0))N−i1{i=j},
and F (0) = −ta αµN(α+β+γµ) .
(3) Stop at the first t such that either of these two conditions (Lemma 3.7)
is met, for some tolerance parameter  > 0:
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(a) |F (t)− 1| ≤ 
(b) |f(t)− 0| ≤ 
(4) If both are met simultaneously, stop and set tb = t.
(5) If (a), then chose a smaller ta and go back to (2).
(6) If (b), then chose a larger ta and go back to (2).
Remark 1 The solution f(t) of (3.11) was proven to be monotonic with
respect to the initial condition ta in [17]. This is sufficient for the above
procedure to converge when a simple bisection procedure is used.
Remark 2 If early birds are not allowed the procedure can be adjusted by
running the search procedure on p0. The discrete computation will now start
at te (computed using equation (3.4)) with initial conditions:
pi,j(te) =
(
N
j
)
pj0(1− p0)N−j
e−µte(µte)j−i
(j − i)! 1{j≥i}. (3.34)
Remark 3 An additional adjustment can be made if we assume closing time
T <∞, such that no arrivals are admitted into the queue after this time. If
tb ≤ T , then no adjustment is required. Otherwise, the conditions in (3) can
be replaced by F (T ) = 1.
3.3.1 Computational advantage of the index model
Suppose that there is no tardiness cost and no closing time, then F (t) < 1 for
any t < ∞. This can be addressed by adding a tolerance parameter  > 0,
and adjusting the stopping rule in (3) to F (t) = 1− . We denote this time
by t := {t : F (t) = 1− }. We next derive the computational complexity for
this case and explain why it is lower than in the general model.
Lemma 3.9 If β = 0 and T =∞, then the computational complexity of the
procedure for N customers, with parameters ∆ and  is O
(
− log()N2
2∆
)
.
Proof If β = 0 and T = ∞, then the initial conditions are known: if early
birds are allowed then ta = −Nγα , and if they are not then:
p0 =
{
γ
γ+α
µ
, α
µ
> γ
1 , α
µ
≤ γ .
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Hence, no bisection is needed and there is only one iteration of the algorithm.
We now compute the number of approximation steps required in one
iteration. The number of partitions the interval [0, t] in the discretization is
t+1
∆
. In each step the probability of all states of the process {Q(t), A(t)} is
approximated. The size of the state space is
|{(i, j) : 0 ≤ i ≤ N, i ≤ j ≤ N}| = (N + 1)(N + 2)
2
. (3.35)
We can conclude that the total number of approximations in the procedure
is (t+1)(N+1)(N+2)
2∆
. Finally, in Lemma 3.5 we showed that the F has an
exponentially decreasing tail, with a rate of 0 < η < µ. Thus for small  we
can approximate t by solving the equation:
1− F (t) = e−ηt, (3.36)
yielding t ∼ − log().
If we assume tardiness costs β > 0 or a closing time T < ∞ (or both),
then the initial conditions are not known and there is a need for a bisection
search for ta (or equivalently, for p0). The complexity of each iteration in
the search is given by Lemma 3.9: O
(
tbN
2
2∆
)
if β > 0 and O
(
TN2
2∆
)
if β = 0.
Note that the number of required iterations for the bisection to converge
is a function the tolerance parameter , and so is the approximated value
of tb in case β > 0. In both cases the computational resources required in
each iteration is of similar magnitude as in the index only case, but multiple
(possibly many) iterations are required.
3.4 Numerical examples
We applied the numerical procedure presented above in order to compute the
equilibrium arrival distribution for several examples. First of all for the case
with no tardiness cost (β = 0), in Figure 6 we see four arrival densities, for
different population sizes. In all four examples the service rate is µ = 20 and
the waiting cost is α = 0.1. By keeping the product Nγ constant at a value
of one, in all of the examples, we also keep the individual equilibrium cost
constant (and equal to one). This also implies that the lower bound of the
support remains constant at ta = −Nγα = 10. The only change is the shape
of the distribution which becomes more ”spread out” as the population size
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increases. It is evident that for a larger number of customers the decrease in
the arrival rate is not exponential at first, but rather starts moderately and
is only exponential in the tail.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium arrival density (µ = 20, α = 0.1, β = 0)
In figure 7 we show the tail behaviour of the hazard rate for increasing
population sizes when all other parameters are kept constant. For N > 1 the
hazard rate is not constant, but as we have shown in Lemma 3.5 it approaches
a constant rate. The numerical examples suggest that this constant rate is
the same as in the case of N = 1, which equals µF (0) = µ
1+ α
γµ
. In other
words, the tail behaviour of the arrival distribution is dependent on the cost
parameters, but no on the population size.
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.0
0.2
0.4
t
h(t
)
N=1    
N=2    
N=6    
N=12    
Figure 7: Hazard rate for different population sizes (µ = 1, α = 1, γ = 1)
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The next examples were computed for the same sets of parameters as in
figure 6, with an addition of a tardiness cost: β = 0.1. These computations
are shown in Figure 8. In this case, the support is finite: [ta, tb]. Increasing
the population now makes the support ”spread out” in both directions, with
customers starting to arrive earlier, and with a more moderate decrease after
time zero.
−20 −15 −10 −5 0 5 10
0.0
0
0.0
4
0.0
8
0.1
2
t
f(t)
gamma=0.1, N=10
gamma=0.02, N=50
gamma=0.01, N=100
gamma=0.005, N=200
Figure 8: Equilibrium arrival density (µ = 20, α = 0.1, β = 0.1)
4 Poisson number of customers
A common model assumption in queueing arrival games is that the num-
ber of customers arriving to the system follows a Poisson distribution with
some parameter λ. Although this assumption might seem to make the
model more complicated, it actually simplifies quite a few of the calcula-
tions. Namely, if each customer believes that the number of other customers
is N ∼ Poisson(λ) 5 and that they all arrive according to the same distribu-
tion F , then the arrival process A(t) is a non-homogeneous in time Poisson
process with rate λf(t). The independent increments then imply that the
number of customers yet to arrive at any given time does not depend on the
number of customers that have already arrived. We assume a linear cost
function with α > 0 and β, γ ≥ 0, no closing time and that early birds are
allowed. Analysis very similar to section 3, leads to the following equilibrium
5It turns out this is consistent with assuming the overall number of customers N + 1
is of the same distribution. Moreover, this phenomenom only holds for Poisson random
variables. See for example McAfee and McMillan [18] or Haviv and Milchtaich [11].
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arrival distribution:
f(t) =

αµ
λ(α+β+γµ)
, t ∈ [ta, 0)
µ(α+β)(1−p0(t))−βµ
λ(α+β+γµ)
, t ∈ [0, tb]
0 , o.w.
, (4.1)
such that
∫ tb
ta
f(t)dt = 1 , f(tb) = 0, and pi(t) = P(Q(t) = i) satisfy:
p
′
i(t) =
{
µp1(t))− λf(t)p0(t) , i = 0
µpi+1(t) + λf(t)pi−1(t)− (µ+ λf(t))pi(t) , i > 0 . (4.2)
Unsurprisingly, the equilibrium solution is of the same functional form as in
[3] and [9]. If β = 0, the arguments of Lemma 1.1 still hold. To be specific,
any customer can ensure an expected cost of no more than the expected
number of customers times the order penalty. Therefore, the equilibrium cost
is λγ and the arrival support is [−λγ
α
,∞). This means that the computational
advantages discussed in the precious section are still valid in the Poisson case.
5 Social optimization and Price of Anarchy
When considering the goal of minimizing the total cost inured by the cus-
tomers, thus maximizing social welfare, then the inclusion of index costs has
no impact on the optimization problem: The order of admittances does not
matter because there is always a first customer, last customer and so on.
If there are N + 1 customers, then the total cost of the order penalties is
γN(N+1)
2
, regardless of the actual order. Including this cost in the definition
of the price of anarchy yields:
PoA :=
(N + 1)ce
γN(N+1)
2
+ copt
, (5.1)
where copt is the total socially optimal expected waiting and tardiness cost.
We will review two examples of social optimization for this model, the first a
scheduling policy when there are no tardiness costs and the second a dynamic
policy for the general model.
5.1 No tardiness costs
If there are no tardiness costs, then the socially optimal schedule is one that
minimizes the expected queue size at arrival times. This problem is only
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relevant when there is a closing time T , for otherwise a central planner could
”spread out” the customers as much he wants and achieve a cost of zero.
5.1.1 Example: N + 1 = 3
If N = 3 and T = 1 it can be verified that scheduling one arrival at zero,
another at T and a third at
t∗ =
{
1
µ
log
(
1+
√
1+4eµ
2
)
, 1
µ
log
(
1+
√
1+4eµ
2
)
≤ 1
1 , o.w.
, (5.2)
is the socially optimal schedule. And the total socially optimal waiting cost
is:
copt = α
(
e−µt
∗
+ e−µ(1 + µ− µt∗ + eµt∗))+ 3γ. (5.3)
Table 1 shows exact computations of the PoA for several model parameters.
When the index cost parameter is large, relative to the waiting cost parameter
then the price of anarchy is lower, as expected since the central planner has
less impact on the total cost. Moreover, the PoA can be very close to one
when the index parameter is the dominant factor in the cost function.
Table 1: Price anarchy computations when N + 1 = 3 and α = 1.
PoA γ = 0.05 γ = 1 γ = 5
µ = 0.5 4.025 2.909 2.273
µ = 1 2.079 2.002 1.995
µ = 2 1.266 1.731 1.928
5.1.2 General number of customers
For a general number of customers, finding an optimal schedule for this prob-
lem is a hard global optimization problem, and typically can only be solved
using heuristic or approximation algorithms. Examples of such algorithms
can be found in Pedgen and Rosenshine [20] or Stein et al. [21]. More re-
cently Hassin and Mendel [8] presented an optimization procedure in the
context of patient scheduling, when some proportion of the customers do
not show up. An alternative formulation of the social optimization problem
is suggested in [7]: The central planner may not specify individual arrival
times to the customers, but rather a distribution for all customers to ran-
domly draw their arrivals from. They provide an approximation algorithm
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for finding the socially optimal distribution which indicates that the optimal
solution is approximately a uniform distribution.
5.2 Tardiness and index costs
A strict lower bound of 2 for the PoA was established in [17], along with
convergence to the bound when the number of customers increases. They
do this by comparing the equilibrium cost to an optimal schedule where the
central planner observes the system and can send a new customer each time
a service is completed. This dynamic policy is still optimal when index costs
are included and then by definition (5.1) we get:
PoA =
(N + 1)ce
γN(N+1)
2
+ βN(N+1)
2µ
. (5.4)
In Lemma 3.8 we showed that ce > N
(
β
µ
+ γ
)
. This leads directly to the
following lemma:
Lemma 5.1 In the general cost model, if the central planner can schedule
arrivals dynamically, then PoA > 2.
We can conclude that even though the central planner cannot reduce the total
index costs, the price of anarchy is still always greater than two, as in the
model without them. This is another property that holds when generalizing
the standard model to include index costs.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have introduced a new cost model for the queueing arrival game, which
penalizes late arrivals for their order of admittance, instead (or in addition)
to the previously modelled tardiness costs. We have shown that there are
several differences between these two models. In particular, if just order
costs are assumed, than the arrival rate decreases exponentially, but does
not reach zero at any finite time. Furthermore, we have shown that the equi-
librium cost, in this case, depends solely on the order penalty parameter. We
have also shown how the equilibrium behaviour changes when limiting the
customer arrival interval, by not allowing to queue before opening time or
by setting a closing time. The equilibrium arrival process characterized here
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is qualitatively similar to the standard tardiness model ([17] and [9]), i.e.
a uniform arrival distribution before the server opens and a decreasing ar-
rival density (with the same functional form) afterwards. However, the index
model is easier to numerically approximate because the initial conditions of
the distribution are derived directly from the model assumptions. The role
of the tardiness cost assumption has been motivated in the literature as an
indirect proxy for an index cost, for example in the concert example. We
have shown here how to take this cost into account directly.
There are a few avenues for further research on this model: considering
non-linear cost functions, populations with non-homogeneous cost parame-
ters or a general service distribution. In the case of non-linear waiting and
order costs, necessary equilibrium conditions may be developed using the
techniques presented here. However, it is hard to provide general sufficient
conditions for the uniqueness or even existence of a Nash equilibrium. This
analysis may be carried out for special cases, such as a quadratic cost func-
tion. It is reasonable to assume that customers differ in their utility functions,
and so the analysis of non-homogeneous customer types is much called for.
This has been considered lately in a queueing context by Guo and Hassin in
[5], and in the closely related queueing arrival game in [15]. The latter studies
the equilibrium arrival pattern in the fluid setting, and extending this analy-
sis to discrete customer models like the one presented in this paper suggests
an interesting research challenge. An additional question that stems directly
from our research is that of characterizing the quasi-stationary distribution
of the queueing process, as defined in [22].
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